

# THE FUTURE OF RHODESIA

By

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ETHEL COLQUHOUN JOLLIE

(MRS. TAWSE JOLLIE)

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*Published by a few of those who earnestly desire a higher form of Government for Southern Rhodesia and who are convinced that the immediate amalgamation of Northern and Southern Rhodesia, desired by the Directors of the British South Africa Co., will prevent or postpone indefinitely the granting of Responsible Government to the people of this country.*

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## PREFACE.

This pamphlet is a condensation of articles which appeared between August and October 1916 in the "Bulawayo Chronicle," with some new material. The writer is known to a wide circle of readers in the Empire as "Mrs. Archibald Colquhoun." Her first husband accompanied the Mashonaland pioneers and was the first Administrator of this country, but he retired because of ill-health in 1891, and devoted himself to travel and literature. Subsequently he was instrumental in effecting the re-organisation of the Royal Colonial Institute, and was the founder and editor of the journal "United Empire," and on his death in 1914 his widow was asked to continue this work as co-editor with Sir Harry Wilson, the Secretary of the Institute. This she did until her marriage with Mr. J. Tawse Jollie, who as a pioneer of 1892 is well known to many people in Rhodesia.

Mrs. Tawse Jollie is the author of two books, "Two on their Travels" and "The Vocation of Woman," and part-author of "The Whirlpool of Europe," and has been a contributor to the "Quarterly Review," "Nineteenth Century," "National Review," "Blackwood's," and other periodicals. She was a member of the Executive Committees of the Woman's Unionist Association, British Woman's Emigration Society, and of the National League for Opposing Woman's Suffrage, and was one of the principal official speakers for these, as well as for the National Service and Imperial Maritime Leagues. In March 1915 she organised, under the War Office, a free buffet at Paddington Station for travelling soldiers and sailors, which was the first of its kind to remain open continuously night and day, and this she superintended till her departure for Rhodesia.

Before her first marriage (in 1900) Mrs. Tawse Jollie studied painting in London and France, and has illustrated several books and exhibited her water-colour drawings in London and elsewhere.





# THE FUTURE OF RHODESIA

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## PART I

### RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT THE GOAL.

Everyone is agreed that Government by a Chartered Company is only a stage in the growth of a country, to be succeeded as soon as possible by some form of responsible government. The question is, at what point a country is capable of shouldering its own responsibilities, and there are many people who hold that S. Rhodesia has not yet reached that point. Their arguments are chiefly based on two grounds: (1) that it is too soon for the settlers to assume financial responsibility, and (2) that Rhodesia without the Company would be forced into Union with the South, and might be swamped by predominantly Dutch political influences. With the second argument we must deal at some length later on; the first was raised by the B.S.A. Co. in the statement issued to the Press with regard to Amalgamation, in December, 1915, in the following words:—

It may be argued that Amalgamation with the North, just as it will make absorption in the Union more difficult, may also and for the same reasons postpone the date at which local responsible government will be possible. *Prima facie*, this argument has force, but in present circumstances, having regard to the numbers of the white population of Southern Rhodesia, and to the position of the territory in the matter of administrative finance as emphasised by the war, the day of local responsible government must necessarily be deferred for some time. Moreover, if the confident expectation that the unification of Rhodesia will result in increased prosperity and more rapid influx of settlers is justified by results, it may prove in the long run that the day of local responsible government has been accelerated rather than retarded. (Visiting Directors' statement, 1915.)

It is necessary to understand clearly what Southern Rhodesia's position is with regard to administrative finance.

### SOUTHERN RHODESIA'S FINANCIAL POSITION.

For five years (from 1909 to 1914) S. Rhodesia paid for her own administration and the construction of public works out of revenue and had a surplus amounting in the aggregate to £350,000. This sum figures in the B.S.A. Co.'s accounts as a set-off against former administrative deficits. In 1914-15 there was a deficit of £130,000 (including public works), partly due to war expenditure which may eventually be met by the Imperial Government. In 1915-16 the deficit was £30,000. For 1916-17 the estimated deficit is £66,000, but trade is improving and the next Budget may be more satisfactory. The deficits have to be met by the B.S.A. Co., but there is no doubt that they are, in reality, merely a deferred liability. Had we been granted responsible government before the war these deficits could have been met in other ways—which are debarred to us so long as we are under Company rule. Moreover, whereas S. Rhodesia has hitherto been debarred by the Imperial Government from borrowing money for public works, but has had to construct them out of current revenue, she is now permitted to borrow

from the B.S.A. Co. at a rate of not more than 5% for such works, "subject to the understanding that, if a change in administration takes place before the whole amount of the loan has been recovered from administrative revenue, the Company will merely be entitled to claim compensation in respect of such proportion (if any) of the value of the buildings in question as the part of the cost which . . . . has not been met out of administrative revenue may bear to the whole cost."

It is evident, therefore, that the financial responsibility for the expense of administering the country has been already shouldered by the settlers. It is not they, however, who decide how the money is to be spent. The B.S.A. Co. is still responsible to the Imperial Government for the administration of the territory, and while it holds this position must also control Rhodesian finances. To quote a letter of the Company to the Colonial Secretary of June 30th, 1914, in reference to a suggestion that the Legislative Council should be empowered to control the allocation of public funds: "In S. Rhodesia the responsibility for the administration and for making good any deficits in the annual Budget rests with the B.S.A. Co., and my Directors could not agree to any real divorce between financial responsibility and the power to spend money."

### DIVISION OF REVENUE.

The Company has divided the revenues of the country under two heads, Commercial and Administrative. The latter, which approximates to £750,000, is mainly derived from two sources, Customs duties and Native hut-tax, which are nearly equal in amount and constitute two-thirds of the whole, the remaining third being derived from Posts & Telegraphs, Licences, Stamps and other receipts in administrative departments. With regard to this allocation of revenue the Auditor-General's report for the year ending 1915 contains the following remarks:—

"From the B.S.A. Co.'s point of view certain revenues are ear-marked 'as 'Commercial,' others as 'Administrative,' but agreement with the people as to that division has not been reached. Whilst the B.S.A. Co. would, no doubt, welcome the audit of all revenues, it would object to a report on such revenues which have been put aside as 'Commercial' being made to the Legislative Council or to any other body, nor could it consent to the officials of the Legislative Council exercising any control in regard thereto. In fact these revenues would, in all probability, be removed from the Auditor's purview. The difficulty can be amplified by stating in the most general terms that revenues derived from taxation and accruing in respect of Ordinances or Acts of Parliament are revenues of State and, as such, should be controlled by Parliament and dealt with under its authority. But some considerable portions of the revenue claimed as 'Commercial' are distinctly derived from Acts of Parliament, *e.g.*, mining royalties and fees generally accruing under the Mines and Minerals Ordinance."

Without any suggestion of unfairness in this allocation of revenue it is essential that it should be understood. When our administrative revenue is stated it must also be stated that the B.S.A. Co. is the sole judge of what constitutes administrative revenue, and that, as a matter of fact, the sources from which this is drawn are more restricted than they would have been, for instance, under Crown Colony Government; much more so under Responsible Government.

### EXPENDITURE ON DEVELOPMENT.

Beyond the question of administrative expenditure there is, however, that of money spent in development. In the early history of Rhodesia almost every item of expenditure naturally came under this head, and the Company



estimates to have spent some £7,000,000, which (in certain contingencies) may be a charge on the country when it assumes responsibility. But clear evidence exists that *no money is at present being expended by the Chartered Co. in this way*. The Company's report and accounts are divided under two heads: (1) Commercial or directly remunerative, (2) "Designed to promote the general development and progress of the country, from which the Company derives an indirect return by way of improved receipts from land, mining and railways." Under the latter head, which must cover all "development work," come the following items (Report to 31st March, 1915): (1) Returns of land sales: sales by auction: new settlers: inspection of land for settlement: settlement of ex-soldiers after the war. (2) Rhodesia Land Bank. (3) Fencing. (4) Dipping tanks. (5) Boring for water. (6) Gwelo Creamery. (7) Salisbury Bacon Factory. (8) Salisbury Oil Factory. (9) Tobacco industry and warehouse. (10) Meat Canning Factory.

A scrutiny of these items reveals the fact that the shareholder will *not* find in them much wherewith to reproach his Directors on the score of expenditure which is only indirectly remunerative. Item one relates to the sale of land, which is part of the commercial work of the Company, and records a slight increase in the price of land from 6s. 2d. in 1914 to 6s. 5d. in 1915. Items 3 and 4 (fencing and dipping tanks) are really sub-sections to No. 2 (Land Bank), and as the Bank has made advances for the most part on first mortgages at an interest of 6%, or on guaranteed promissory notes at 7 and 8%, this seems a very sound part of the business organisation. The Gwelo Creamery has met all expenses, including depreciation, and pays interest at  $4\frac{1}{2}\%$ , while the Bacon Factory sales "justify the expectation that the profit-earning stage will shortly be reached." We now know that the Company regard 8% as a reasonable return on this investment and on the Oil Factory. Under No. 9 the slump in tobacco is recorded, and it is mentioned that the Company came to the help of certain settlers who were threatened with ruin by lending them cash and cattle, but it would be interesting to know what were the increased profits on the sale of land which the Company had previously been able to net through the reckless booming of tobacco in certain districts, and how far the Company's competition as a grower contributed to the difficulties of those settlers. As to No. 10 (Meat Canning Factory), this reports the engagement of an expert to report on the prospects of meat canning in Rhodesia. It is now known that the farmers of Rhodesia do not view with favour the establishment of any further industries under the aegis of the Company, though they are prepared to accept the co-operation of the latter, which, as an owner of cattle and large ranching areas, is as much concerned for the future of the meat industry as any farmer. In taking this line the farmers of Rhodesia are not actuated by mere prejudice, but (as the result of experience) by business considerations. The share taken by the Company in preliminary investigations, while legitimately regarded as "development" work, is only what might be expected from a large stock-owner.

Therefore, while it is perfectly true that, as the holder of large interests in Rhodesia the Company is deeply concerned with the welfare of the country, and while it is ridiculous to suggest that they would willingly do anything contrary to those interests, it is yet clear that their day of acting as Fairy Godmother is long over and they are intrinsically a commercial company trading in a variety of ways and bent on making profits. It is notorious that Chartered shareholders have never received any dividend, but the railways and mines owned and controlled by the same groups are paying concerns. In the financial year which ended March, 1915, £1,200,000 was earned in the form of profits on mining and on railways. These figures are

given in the B.S.A. Co.'s report to its shareholders and do not, of course, include profits on the sale of land or the other commercial undertakings of the Company.

### THE COMPANY'S CLAIMS.

As to the exact nature of the financial claims which the Company will be entitled to make when handing the country over to the settlers, great uncertainty exists. In 1898 Mr. Rhodes told a meeting of the shareholders in London that the money spent on the "conquest and development of Rhodesia" should, when that country attained responsible government, become a debenture debt. But since that time the situation has been altered by the introduction of the Land Case now before the Privy Council.

### THE LAND CASE.

The question to be decided is whether the land of S. Rhodesia belongs in perpetuity to the Chartered Company, whether it is vested in the Imperial Government, for whom the Company acted as agent, or whether by the terms of the concessions and of the Charter it is really the property of the people of S. Rhodesia, black and white. It may be said that Imperial ownership is practically the same as ownership by the people, since the Imperial Government has never yet reserved to itself any rights in land when handing over a country to a white self-governing community. If the Privy Council gives the land to the Company then all claims for conquest and development are wiped out and S. Rhodesia can start at any moment with a clean sheet, her only obligation being to take over public buildings at a valuation. This is clearly shewn in Mr. Maguire's statement of policy, March, 1913. He is assuming the Company's ownership of land: "For the past, you are 'relieved of all anxiety as to administrative deficits. Now, just think what 'that means. It means that each citizen of Rhodesia, present or future, 'shares in the benefits which this expenditure of the Company has produced."

*Inter alia*, it may be added, it also means that citizens of Rhodesia will be in a position not occupied by any other white men in the world—that they do not own, as a people, an inch of the territory in which they live, and have no control over the sale, allocation or use of that land.

If, on the other hand, the Privy Council decides that the concessions do not give the B.S.A. Co. the ownership of the land, that land must become the property of the S. Rhodesian people. Existing land titles are not threatened. They are clearly covered both by concessions and charter. But if the people own the land they must repay the Company for the cost of development and conquest of it. The sum oftenest quoted in this connection, founded on the Company's own estimate, is £7,000,000. But it does not follow that that sum would be accepted without cavil by the Imperial Government. The amount paid in compensation by the Imperial Government itself to such companies as those which developed the basin of the Niger or British East Africa have not covered capital expenditure. Moreover, a large proportion of this sum will be held to have been expended on the development of assets which will still remain the property of the Company, such as mines, estates, and railways.

Be this as it may, a reference to the Visiting Directors' statement will shew that they make no allusion to this side of Rhodesia's financial responsibilities, but state merely that owing to the "numbers of the white population" and the position of the territory with regard to administrative finance " . . . the day of local responsible government must in any case be "postponed for some time."

Having regard to the fact that, until the outbreak of the war, S. Rhodesia's administrative revenue shewed a respectable surplus, and that,



unlike every other country in the Empire, she has neither borrowed nor imposed new taxation to meet war expenses, one wonders to what stage of affluence she is expected to attain before she may hope to control her own affairs—including the expenditure of her own money.

#### A PRECEDENT—NATAL AND SELF-GOVERNMENT.

Perhaps at this point it may be useful to recall what has been the experience elsewhere. A Canadian friend tells me that the people of the territory administered by the Hudson Bay Company asked for and got a form of responsible government when their numbers were considerably lower than ours and their financial position less sound.

An instance nearer home is that of Natal. In 1894, when Natal was granted self-government she had an European population of 46,000, Indians 30,000, and natives 483,000. Her revenue was approximately £1,000,000, her expenditure exceeded this by £82,000, and she had a public debt of no less than £8,000,000. Her actual expenditure on administration (apart from interest on this debt) was about £750,000—very much the same as our own, but this included £300,000 for railways, and the revenue included £450,000 under the same head. Exclusive of railways both revenue and expenditure were smaller than ours, and the deficit was larger.

## PART II

### AMALGAMATION.

It is under these circumstances, with the Land Case still in abeyance, that the proposal for amalgamating Northern and Southern Rhodesia was made, in a statement of which a portion has already been quoted. Among the reasons given in support of the proposal are the following:—

1. A United Rhodesia will have a stronger voice in the settlement after the war.
2. *Economy and efficiency* will be promoted and the amalgamated services, by affording a wider scope, will be more attractive.
3. Amalgamation will *promote prosperity* and so *encourage immigration*.
4. Amalgamation will make *Union with the South* “*more difficult*.”

We propose to deal with each argument in turn.

#### “A STRONGER VOICE.”

While it has been generally recognised that the Dominions, which have played so worthy a part in the war, are entitled to some voice in the making of peace, the greatest difficulty exists in our present lack of an Imperial constitution in giving effect to this view. Only one body exists which can in any degree claim to represent the views of the Dominions, and that is the Imperial (once the Colonial) Conference. Each of the self-governing Dominions is represented on this Conference by one responsible Minister, and the British Prime Minister usually presides, while the Colonial Secretary convenes the Conference and is an important member of it. Every member has one vote, and resolutions when passed are presented to the Imperial Government. The debates are not held in public, but an official report is issued to the Press. The Imperial Conference has a permanent secretariat in the Colonial Office. It meets quadrennially and was due in 1915, but despite some evidences of desire that it should not be postponed Mr. Asquith and Mr. Harcourt decided not to summon it, contenting themselves with the statement that each Prime Minister would be consulted “fully and if possible



personally" in any matter affecting his own Dominion. The assumption that the Empire is divided into watertight compartments is characteristic of a type of British statesmanship. It has been abandoned since the advent of Lord Milner and Lord Curzon in the War Cabinet, and the Imperial Conference is to meet shortly and will undoubtedly discuss possible peace terms as they affect the Empire as a whole, after-war settlement, and the future organisation of the British Empire. Possibly the Dominion Ministers may be invited to attend the War Council.

But the only Government with executive powers in these matters at present is the British Government, and peace, when it comes to be discussed, will be settled by plenipotentiaries from all the combatant Powers. The British Empire will have one representative, not five, and he will have to represent the interests of all the different parts of the Empire, while he is responsible only to one. In doing this he will undoubtedly be helped by the collective decisions of the Imperial Conference, but he must take instructions from the British Cabinet.

At what stage of these negotiations is the voice of Rhodesia, united or not, to be heard, and through what medium? We cannot be represented on the Imperial Conference, whose constitution is already fixed. India is not represented there. We have no more "right" there than British North Borneo, which is the only other British territory still under chartered company rule.

#### CINDERELLA RHODESIA.

It is necessary to be quite frank as to the position of South Rhodesia in the Empire. We are at present neither *fish*, *fowl*, nor *good red herring*—neither self-governing equals, helpless dependents, nor pampered Crown colonists. (I may say that, having a considerable acquaintance with Crown Colonies, I never thought them pampered until I came to live in Rhodesia, and that I am not speaking of the Crown Colony of twenty or even less years ago. I am speaking of the creations of the modern Colonial Office, as compared with which Rhodesia is a Cinderella indeed.) We have no High Commissioner in London to be the central figure at every public dinner, no Agent-General to act on committees and "say a few words" at public meetings, no Governors and Colonial Secretaries forever going Home and sitting on the doorsteps of the Colonial Office until they get what they want—and with a habit of retiring and becoming members of Parliament and regular contributors to the Press. I venture to say—and I have lived in the midst of the "colonial" world in London—that *Rhodesia is one of the least known and least understood portions of the British Empire*. Were it not for the glamour of the Founder's name our obscurity would be even more marked. We have, it is true, an Imperial Commissioner as our link with the Imperial Government, *but only those who have been in touch with English politics of late years can realise how sensitive all departments of the Administration have become to what is called "public opinion," and we Rhodesians have at present no channel through which to come in contact with this powerful organ—save London Wall*. Even the Imperial authorities themselves, should they want to know anything about us, must be affected by the fact that the High Commissioner cannot be communicated with at any length under eight weeks—while there is a telephone to London Wall. Finally, while I do not wish to libel the useful Mr. Reuter, I have a suspicion that when he wants to insert any news about us in the English papers he, too, takes the line of least resistance.

#### OUR "VOICE."

Whatever form the pre-peace discussions take, therefore, it is difficult to see where and how "the voice of Rhodesia" will be heard, or how the amalgamation would make articulate those who as yet have no voice. At the

present stage of our political evolution London Wall speaks for us—neither the British people nor the British Government can distinguish between the B.S.A. Co. and “Rhodesia.” Of course, if there is a concrete proposal and time to spare it might be referred to the Legislative Council which is the “voice of Rhodesia” up to a certain point. I mean that it expresses the views of the people, but with limitations due to its composition and to the political conditions under which it is called together. But the sort of questions which will arise in any peace negotiations are not likely to be of the kind that can be discussed for weeks and then voted on. The self-governing Dominions will have to trust their Ministers (who are their elected representatives) to do their best, and it may be said here that we can also trust London Wall to do its best, according to its lights, for Rhodesia. But London Wall, even as the mouthpiece of Rhodesia, cannot have the same kind of “voice” as a self-governing Dominion. I am inclined to think that the desire to gain weight is not unconnected with the Company’s proposal, but it would be better if they stated it frankly. If they said, “We as representing United Rhodesia may get more out of the settlement than we can as a commercial company”—well, it might not sound particularly altruistic, but it would at all events clear the air! But in whatever form Rhodesia is represented we may make up our minds that we shall not get anything which a self-governing Dominion does not want us to have, nor which the Chartered Company could not get equally well under existing conditions. The pictures of the impressiveness of “United Rhodesia” are purely fancy ones. *I am inclined to think that we should be far less impressive if by Amalgamation we increased so enormously the disproportion of our numbers to the territory we occupy.*

#### POSSIBLE GAINS.

While few Rhodesians look upon their share in the war in a sordid spirit, there have been certain vague suggestions of the advantages which United Rhodesia might gain in a redistribution of Central African territory. A glance at the map will dispose of this vagueness. The countries bordering on Northern Rhodesia belong to our Allies the Belgians (who are not likely to want to part with any of their rich Congo region), our Allies the Portuguese, and our enemies the Germans. German East has been divided as spoils in many a magazine and newspaper article, but I have never seen any portion of it assigned to Rhodesia! Nyasaland is the remaining neighbour whose future is obviously linked with that of N. Rhodesia, but a Crown Colony cannot against its will be transferred to Company rule, and Nyasaland has expressed herself clearly with regard to her own future. A deal with the Portuguese is assumed to be one of the possibilities of the situation, but in the somewhat remote contingency of Portugal being prepared to part with what we want, this possibility cannot be affected by a change in the administrative system of N. Rhodesia. In any case, as I have pointed out, *united or separate, the Chartered Company speaks for Rhodesia*, and the suggestion that by transferring its property, so to speak, from one pocket to the other it becomes a wealthier and more powerful agent requires more elucidation than has, so far, been given us.

#### THE IMPERIAL ASPECT.

Attempts have been made in the Rhodesian press and elsewhere to create the impression that the Imperial Government, if it did not actually initiate the Amalgamation scheme, gives it the warmest support. The “Rhodesia Herald” has not hesitated to suggest that this is being done in order to “frustrate the realisation of any territorial ambitions which General Botha may hope to attain with the help of the Imperial Conference.”

It is suggested in the same organ that this is one of two "particularly cogent reasons why Mr. Bonar Law cannot come forward as a frank, benevolent advocate of Amalgamation." The inference that the Imperial Government has conspired with the B.S.A. Co. to "dish" General Botha would be too ridiculous for notice were it not mischievous, and would scandalise any responsible statesman in Great Britain.

As a matter of fact, the High Commissioner came to Rhodesia in August 1915, and it is not unreasonable to suppose that his visit had something to do with the Amalgamation proposal. He made the following clear statement:—

*"After careful consideration of the matter by the Secretary of State, it does not appear to him or to me that any Imperial interest would be affected by the proposal, by which I mean that no Imperial interest would be affected by Amalgamation on the one hand, nor on the other hand by leaving things as they are."*

Those people who, on such a foundation, have erected a whole theory of Imperial designs and desires, are letting the wish be father to the thought. They are to be classed with those who can extract from an expression of politeness, such as "Good luck to you" from an overworked official (probably glad to see the last of his visitor) a story that the British Government is heartily in favour of his (the visitor's) pet project!

#### EFFICIENCY AND ECONOMY.

The argument under this head does not need detailed treatment, for it has not been taken very seriously even by supporters of Amalgamation. Southern Rhodesia cannot be expected to wax very enthusiastic over economies in Northern Rhodesian administration, and some of the more outlying districts of our big country, which have hitherto regretfully accepted the limitations imposed on our civil servants by the distances to be covered, are wondering how they will be affected when the Chief Veterinary Surgeon, for instance, has to include Northern Rhodesia in his area of supervision?

It is not as if we are offered anything tangible in exchange. The Administrator, when approached on the subject, said that the Company was not prepared to purchase support for their scheme by any concessions as to land, mineral or other rights which are vested in them. Such hypothetical advantages as a greater freedom for cattle movement, the interchangeability of the services, uniformity of law, and other details could be secured without the slightest difficulty without Amalgamation if they are intrinsically desirable.

#### AMALGAMATION AND IMMIGRATION.

There are many reasons why an increase by British immigration of the white population is a vital matter to the progress of Rhodesia and of South Africa as a whole. I say "British immigration" not because I believe the man from the British Isles to be a better settler than a South African or other colonial-born man, but because it does not help the Empire to the same extent to take a man from one Dominion to another. What we want is to take the men who are crowded off the land in the small, well-populated British Isles and put him on the land in the sparsely populated, vast Dominions. Another reason is that, especially in Africa, I believe a constant renewal of European blood to be an advantage. The vitality of the Dutch people seems to negative the necessity for this, but there are qualities in which the South African born is sometimes lacking, which are natural to men brought up in the cold, invigorating British climate and without the influences inseparable from a country with a black population. I say, therefore,



we want more British blood. Those people who are most afraid of Union, because of the political influences which may come with it, should be strong supporters of this view. According to them it is all important to build up our "British" population as rapidly as possible, for it must not be forgotten that we have a Dutch population in Rhodesia, and that the rate of natural increase is higher than among any other section of the community, and is rising. In 1912 19.39 per cent. of our total births were of Dutch parents. In 1915 the percentage was 23.85, or 187 out of a total of 784. Mixed marriages—Dutch and British—accounted for 53 more.

### EX-SOLDIER SETTLERS.

It is believed that a great exodus of men from England will take place when the British armies are disbanded, because so many men will not feel inclined to go back to city life. As the war continues, however, the number thus affected gets smaller, and for these reasons:—

1. The growing list of killed and maimed.
2. The increasing number who, while unwounded, will suffer all their lives from the terrible experiences through which they have passed. ("Nerve" cases are increasingly numerous.)
3. The thinning of the ranks of skilled labour in Great Britain. Women and old men cannot permanently fill up these ranks, and there will be the more openings for the better class of soldier. Some authorities have predicted a "slump" in trade after the war and consequent unemployment and emigration. Others—in increasing numbers—seem inclined to believe that Great Britain may begin a new phase of industrial and agricultural development. This will mean employment for all classes and special attractions for those with brains and skill.

In addition there is a strong movement to keep British ex-soldiers at Home and settle them on the land hitherto uncultivated. Schemes of settlement are already at work, and the Government is being asked to greatly increase the sum of £2,000,000 already voted for the purpose.

### WHAT RHODESIA WANTS.

Rhodesia is not interested in any type of settler save the one with capital. The B.S.A. Co. has given 500,000 acres of land free for ex-soldier settlement. At the time of writing the location of these farms is not announced, but at a recent meeting in London it was stated that a capital of £1,000 was necessary for a settler taking up one of these free farms. Under the present conditions such an estimate will not be contested. What are the chances of getting such men?

In the first place young men with capital of £1,000 or over who wish to emigrate are found in England chiefly among two classes—younger sons of landed proprietors, and the sons of successful business and professional men—in other words, what are known as the upper and middle classes. These, alas! are those who have paid heaviest toll in the war. The professional classes, particularly, among whom large families, once the rule, had become the exception, have lost out of all proportion to their numbers, as any reader of the casualty lists must know. They have also suffered most heavily financially. Business men in many cases have suffered less in this way, but these have usually good openings at home for their sons. The nest eggs have vanished and will be harder to collect in future, with the heavy taxation to which the British citizen so cheerfully submits. Moreover, unless I am mistaken, there is a more practical spirit among our younger men than used to be. The attractions of such a country as Rhodesia, where the white man belongs to a "sahib" class and where there is sport and adventure still to be had, will weigh less with this generation than the possibility of getting a

decent return for money invested. The best advertisement a country can have is for a man to write Home and tell all his friends, "Come out here—it is a sure thing—look how well I am doing." There are villages I know of in England and Scotland where a young man has come home from Canada and collected practically every able-bodied resident to go back with him! What then is Rhodesia doing to advertise her charms or to attract settlers? Perhaps it may be simpler to ask what she is not doing?

### TO ATTRACT SETTLERS.

All over one of the busiest parts of London—the Strand, Pall Mall, Cockspur Street—and in most of our big provincial cities, there are attractively got up offices, where intending emigrants are taken in hand by nice-spoken young gentlemen, are shewn monster apples, glass jars of cereals, coloured maps, miles of statistical records, and a vast quantity of other printed and illustrated matter. These are intended to attract him to Canada, Australia or New Zealand. *Rhodesia has no such office.*

All over England and Scotland agents go about giving lectures in villages with lantern slides (entrance free) and they distribute literature, also free, and give free information. *None of these men work for Rhodesia.*

Every emigrant desiring to settle on the land in Canada, Australia or New Zealand will find special facilities as to transport. Under certain circumstances and to certain Dominions he used to get his fare advanced, and where this was not possible the rates quoted were extremely low. He could get to Canada for £5, to Australia for something like £17. Many men with capital took advantage of these rates to go out and have a look round. There was competition for the emigrant traffic to the Commonwealth and the Dominions. Rates for wives and children and for settlers' effects were equally accommodating, and special matrons were engaged to travel with and look after young girls. I use the past tense because, when the war is over, Australia, and probably other Dominions, will be running their own lines of steamships, which will be an even greater advantage for emigrant traffic.

The Rhodesian Government—or rather the B.S.A. Co.—has, it is true, arranged to refund the whole of the railway fare on their own line and half that on the Union lines to any settler taking out the papers for a farm, but steamer rates are heavy, and it is not the same inducement to a man to be promised a refund as to be given a reduced fare on the spot. The journey, whether *via* the Cape or Beira, is a complicated one for the unaccustomed traveller, and the incidental expenses are high and uncertain. Women and children can get reduced terms through the Rhodesian Committee of the South African Colonisation Society, and they estimate the fares at £14, third-class boat and second-class train, or £26 second-class throughout. The class of settler which Rhodesia hopes to get would not care to travel third on the Cape boats.

Finally, all the Dominions except South Africa have now promised to give to all British ex-soldiers the same advantages that are being prepared for their own men, and what these are can be judged from the fact that *the Commonwealth of Australia is prepared to spend £20,000,000 in a period of five years on her land settlement policy*, and this in addition to what is being spent by individuals and by States. The work has begun already, some 200 men having been "settled" in 1916. The schemes on foot in the various Dominions were outlined to Sir Rider Haggard on a tour round the Empire which he undertook for the purpose of inquiry. They include the provision of irrigated, seeded farms, with buildings, implements, etc., in some of the finest districts. In Canada the Canadian Pacific Co. will give ready-made homesteads on a perpetual lease at a nominal rent and with no deposit. In

Tasmania the best fruit districts are prepared to give farms to ex-soldier settlers. Free homesteads have been offered before, but never on such terms as are now being made.

### LAND SETTLEMENT IN THE UNION.

South Africa has not joined in this competition, chiefly for political reasons, but a committee has been formed in London to advise and help all those who may desire to go to South Africa, where, of course, some capital is necessary, and there are private co-operative schemes on foot which offer good openings to men with £500 to £1,000.\* The Union Government is buying land for the settlement of its own returned soldiers, as it states that the supply of Crown lands is not suitable or sufficient.

Some details of land settlement policy in the Union may be useful for purposes of comparison with Rhodesia. All parts of South Africa have an advantage over other Dominions for a certain type of British settler, because the presence of a black population releases them (and especially their women-folk) from the hardest and most menial tasks. In addition there is the splendid climate, in many parts the fine scenery, and (in the Union) the seaside health resorts, educational facilities, and other amenities not easily matched in the rural regions of the other Dominions. These conditions will, in some cases, outweigh the greater facilities offered elsewhere, and it is therefore important to know on what terms land can be had in the Union and in Southern Rhodesia.

### THE S.A. LAND SETTLEMENT ACT.

Under the South African Land Settlement Act of 1912 a man if he desires to settle in the Union can obtain land on the following terms: the Government buys the land, the applicant contributing not less than one-fifth of the purchase price and becoming the lessee of the land until the unpaid proportion is paid off. Land is also leased for long terms with option of purchase extending over long periods—as much as twenty years. In both cases the rate of interest does not exceed 4%. Assistance is also given by the Land Banks and the Irrigation Department.

### PRICE OF LAND.

As to price, I have before me a pamphlet issued by the Company giving the price of land in various colonies. Without details as to the character of land, railway facilities and distance from coast such information is of doubtful value, but the price of unimproved Crown lands in New Zealand is given thus: 1st class, 20/- per acre; 2nd class, 10/3; 3rd class, 2/6. This grading suggests a method which the Company apparently have not followed, since we are told in the B.S.A. Company's handbook that the average price throughout the territory is 13/- to 14/-

The prices quoted for land in the Union are given for the year 1911, but it is not stated whether the prices obtained include sales of private lands, so I will give instead a table supplied by Mr. F. N. Still, of the Lands Department, to Sir Rider Haggard:—

<i>Province.</i>	<i>Lands allotted.</i>	<i>£ s. d.</i>
Transvaal ... ..	223,800 acres @	0 6 2
Natal ... ..	30,000 „ @	1 2 2
Transvaal ... ..	137,160 „ @	0 2 10
General ... ..	1,696,000 „ @	0 3 8
Do. ... ..	720,000 „ @	0 3 2
Natal ... ..	564,000 „ @	0 5 8



The period covered is that comprised between the passing of the Land Act, 1912, and the beginning of the war, and the land is, of course, unallotted Crown lands. While the quality of such land as remains unallotted in the Union is undoubtedly inferior in some respects to similar areas in Rhodesia, there are compensations to be found in the way of industrial expansion and the rapid rise of new markets, good communications, social and educational advantages which are certainly not present in all parts of Rhodesia.

### LAND SETTLEMENT IN RHODESIA.

With all these instances of what is being done elsewhere to attract immigration it is easier to see what Rhodesia loses by what she leaves undone. It is true information can be got by going to London Wall and pamphlets are bestowed gratis. The ones I have seen gave the average price of land at 14/- a morgen. But London Wall is outside the "beat" of most possible emigrants. One sometimes sees advertisements of "Sunny Rhodesia," with the conventional slouch-hatted, top-booted farmer regarding his beeves and stocks with obvious satisfaction. But, it may be said, it is no use advertising in a popular way for the only class of settler who can make a living out here. Still these advertisements do strike the imagination of a type of man who may be all we want, including some £1,500 in his pocket, but who never reads books. London Wall is a remote place for an emigration office. Once upon a time a yeoman farmer with eight sons came to a friend of mine for advice as to where to emigrate. He was a capitalist in a small way. He was advised to go to a certain State, but coming out of my friend's office he saw opposite the newly-fitted emigration office of another State. That decided his fate. *Verbum sap.* But, having decided to come to Rhodesia, having spent a big lump of capital in coming here, what are the terms offered?

### A SAMPLE FARM.

The following concrete example may be given, as there is no reason to suppose it out of the ordinary. I may mention that the preliminary negotiations over this farm took seven months.. The farm includes 2,400 morgen, and the price is 13/- per morgen, or £1,560, to be paid in five years, with an extension of five at the option of the Company, interest at the rate of 6 per cent., viz., £93 per annum. Conditions of occupation: the cultivation of 72 morgen or the maintenance of 75 head of breeding cattle, or the erection of farm buildings, or a proportion of all these. The farm is situated 160 miles from the railway in a district at present closed for cattle movement, and with the heavy expense involved in buildings and dipping tank under such circumstances, the farmer would be unable to pay his running expenses and the interest, so that the £93 per annum would have to be found out of capital. Should he be unable to complete his contract he has no claim for compensation for improvements. It becomes obvious that a capital of £2,000 would not be enough to enable a man to take up such a farm, and when it is noted that adjacent farms are offered, some of them already developed, at a much lower figure, it becomes apparent that this is not a really genuine selling price. But in this case the district, which badly needs population, loses a settler, and the same must have occurred elsewhere. Would-be settlers studying the Company's terms before coming to Rhodesia are bound to be struck by such figures as these.

This is, of course, a ranching proposition, and the Company in their leaflets for settlers give the necessary capital at about £1,500 to £2,000. What appears disproportionate is the amount of this capital which is absorbed in acquiring what is really the roughest of veld. Land may also be acquired by a permit of occupation with the option of purchase for cash or by instalments at any time within ten years. The rent is 6% of the purchase price, and there are

various conditions of occupation and development to be fulfilled, but again, no claim for compensation for improvement should the tenant not wish to purchase at the end of his term. Having in view the present difficulty of finding markets for farmers and the rates charged on railways, it cannot be pretended that such terms as these are attractive to the man with small capital.

### IN NORTHERN RHODESIA.

As for Land Policy in Northern Rhodesia, I have only one unofficial source of information—a paper read before the Royal Colonial Institute by the late Colonel St. Hill Gibbons. In January, 1914, he stated categorically that the land policy of that region had been radically altered, the price of land advanced to 5/- per acre, and in consequence immigration had been at a standstill for the last eighteen months. An association of settlers had been formed to ask for one of three things: (a) an improvement in the existing policy of administration, (b) the introduction of a representative form of government, or (c) the institution of Crown Colony government. Colonel Gibbons' statements were criticised but not controverted either at the time the paper was read and discussed or when it was published, and it was significant that his chairman, Sir Arthur Lawley, expressed the opinion that, after all, 5/- an acre was not an exorbitant price for land, even in the heart of Africa, where roads, as yet, do not exist! As not only Colonel Gibbons but a too large number of Northern Rhodesians are either fighting or lying in soldiers' graves, I make no apology for an attempt to voice their point of view as it had reached me before the war began, and that view was that *no encouragement worth the name was being given to would-be settlers*; indeed, they went so far as to speak of the country as "closed to immigration."

### LAND TITLES IN N. RHODESIA.

The question of land title in Northern Rhodesia is still wrapped in mystery, despite the sphinx-like statement recently given from the Colonial Office. In reply to the question as to whether there was not difficulty in obtaining titles, Mr. Harcourt said that this is due to "the complexity of the terms of the original grants from chiefs and others," but added that no doubt exists that title will be granted "*in due course where they are due.*" It would appear from Mr. Harcourt's statement that a good deal more needs to be known as to these original grants and concessions before we can form a balanced opinion on the future of land settlement in Northern Rhodesia.

### RAILWAYS.

This is a question on which not much can be said at present, because it is shortly to be the subject of a Commission, and until that Commission reports comments are premature. But on certain broad lines criticism is inevitable. We are accustomed to hear the boast that Rhodesia has more miles of railway per head of population than any other colony, but it must be remembered that these railways have always been built with an eye, not to agriculture but to mining interests. What guarantee have we that this policy will not continue in the future, or that the settler on the land will be able to count on further internal railways or on the opening of new markets? It is notorious that railways operating in agricultural districts must frequently be run at a loss for the first few years, carrying fertilisers, implements and the like at nominal rates until the farmers are firmly established. Even where the farmer is served by railways in Rhodesia he is handicapped by rates, which must pay respectable dividends. A case was given at the Agricultural Congress, where £10 worth of fertiliser cost £7 18s. 4d. to transport 107 miles. The answer to complaints is always the legitimate one that the railways must be run as business concerns, but an absolute essential to

the future of land settlement in Rhodesia is that the country itself should control railway policy, so that it may be part of a general scheme of development, and not a watertight dividend-earning compartment by itself.

### RHODESIA'S POPULATION.

It will be noted by referring again to the Visiting Directors' statement quoted on Page 1, that "*the present numbers of the white population*" is given as a reason for the postponement of responsible government for "*some time*," and it is suggested that Amalgamation, by stimulating immigration, may shorten the period of waiting. But as no reason has ever been advanced *why* Amalgamation should stimulate immigration, this compensatory clause does not carry much conviction. In the teeth of all that is being done to attract every eligible man in the British Isles to other parts of the Empire it appears hardly likely that we shall get more immigration than in past years from this source. I am inclined to go a good deal further than this. The highest emigration from the British Isles in any one year was 300,000, an abnormal figure due to widespread unemployment, of whom an appreciable number was made up of the Irish stream to the United States, which is likely to continue, for this reason: Irish people are extremely "clannish," and nearly every Irish peasant family has relations in the United States to whom the younger members are sent as soon as they are old enough, because they can earn far higher wages than in the United Kingdom either as domestic servants or as labourers. After the war there will be an unusual number of openings for "ex-soldiers," and practically all possible emigrants of every class will be "ex-soldiers." I believe emigration will "boom" for a year or so, and then 'slump.' If we do not get our influx soon we may whistle for it.

### ACTUAL INCREASE.

The total white population before the war was 31,000, and the increase for the last normal year (1913) was 3,000. This figure, being taken from railway reports, does not permit of analysis, and is merely the excess of arrivals over departures. The latest figures take us to June, 1915, and give an excess of births over deaths of 425 and of immigration over emigration of 921—a total increase of 1,346, and a total white population of 32,000. The number of farms in occupation is 2,045, and the Company report a sale of 300 farms in the last normal year, 1913. The latter figure does not necessarily mean 300 new farmers, and I have not been able to obtain reliable statistics as to the increase in the farming population, which is important in view of the fact that the mining community is fluctuating and not permanent. The wastage of war will leave us a good deal to make up.

N. Rhodesia before the war had a population of about 2,000, of whom 700 were women and children, and her farmers numbered about 200; but this figure must have been seriously reduced by the war.

While it is obvious that a country like Rhodesia cannot hope to compete with others, where the <sup>white</sup> man has the field to himself, for European immigration, yet I believe there is *no reason to be satisfied with the present rate of progress*. Competition for white settlers is getting keener, and we cannot hope to join in it under the present régime. It has been represented to me that "we do not want white settlers to come in too fast." Each one, it is said, becomes a producer and wants to sell that produce in order to make a living. He wants black labour, and we feel that black labour is already sufficiently sought after. He is to be regarded as a fresh competitor, and the markets are so limited! This antiquated view of economics is confined to Rhodesia. Everywhere else in the world people have been convinced that *a white community cannot grow too fast for its own welfare, so long as it is settled on the land and is producing food*. But then such white communities expected to be free to work out their own salvation, to fight for their own



hand and to seek outlets for their own energies. The finding of markets for their surplus produce was not left to individual effort, but was an essential feature of government policy. Above all, they have always owned the land and controlled the means of communication. When we consider the importance of food production in the era which is just beginning, now that America is fast reaching the point when she will import instead of export, and when the cataclysm of war has put back the food production of Europe, probably for a whole generation, it is hard to find any justification for the idea that S. Rhodesia need not bother her head about stimulating white immigration.

*The opportunity of increasing our white population which may occur at the end of the war is one that can hardly be seen again in this generation—if ever. Why can we not grasp it?*

#### THE COMPANY AND IMMIGRATION.

I am not in sympathy with the many people in Rhodesia who grumble because "the Company does not do this" or "does that." So long as we are under Company rule—and the country chose to remain under that rule in 1914—we have no right to complain that things are done or left undone which might be different if we controlled our own affairs. The Company has a divided duty. It has the interests of its shareholders to consider, and cannot spend any more of their money on enterprises which, however promising, may not fructify during the period in which they will be of either direct or indirect profit to those shareholders. Immigration is one of those things.

It is worth a great deal more than £20,000,000 to Australia to get, as she hopes, the cream of British manhood (and of her own manhood, too) settled on her vacant lands. She is in a position to spend that money now in order to reap future benefits. It is a business proposition for any State. Canada shewed the way, and her progress has justified the policy which she struck out. But far from being a profitable speculation for the Chartered Company it is only too obvious that an influx of white settlers would shorten their term of authority. Indirect benefits such as the increase of railway receipts and the revenue from the sale of farms are not of sufficient importance to them to make a strong land settlement policy financially justifiable.

A land settlement scheme was, I understand, passed and ready for promulgation, before the war or the land case (or both), led to its being shelved. It is, of course, impossible to have a strong land settlement policy until the Land Question is settled, but it is equally impossible to have an adequate land settlement policy so long as the Company governs Rhodesia. "Policy" is a nice, vague word. Let us be more explicit. To get settlers in Rhodesia in any numbers needs the expenditure of money. That money could undoubtedly be raised by a responsible government in the form of a development loan, the Company being bound in its own interests to support such a loan. The surplus of the administrative revenue between 1909-14 averaged £70,000 yearly—a sum sufficient to pay interest on a loan of over one million and a quarter.

#### AMALGAMATION AND SELF-GOVERNMENT.

All these various lines of inquiry throw light on the statement that Amalgamation, by stimulating progress and leading to an influx of settlers, may in the long run accelerate instead of retarding self-government. There is evidence that *Southern Rhodesia could have self-government at any time.* She could have had it in 1914, and so deeply convinced was the Colonial Office that the Company's régime could not last much longer that Mr. Harcourt wrote as follows: "The circumstances of Southern Rhodesia are changing" and the process of change may become more rapid in the future. His "Majesty's Government do not feel justified in binding their own hands and

"the hands of their successors for ten years, nor do they think that the electors of Southern Rhodesia would view with favour the abandonment for so long a period of all prospect of constitutional change."

In accordance with this view the Legislative Council is empowered to ask for responsible government at any time, and the B.S.A. Co. and the Imperial Government are practically bound to concur. I find an impression in Rhodesia that the Imperial Government is likely to take a strict view and to be exacting in the matter. I can assure them that no Government, Liberal or Conservative, would care to incur the odium of refusing to a white community (which pays for its own administration) the right to free itself from the control of a commercial company.

At this critical stage in our political development Southern Rhodesia is asked to step aside—"only for a moment," it is true, but still to go out of the way—to take over the administration of a territory larger in area than herself and in a very different stage of development. To do so will mean the abandonment of all hope of self-government for the next twenty-five years. It has taken Southern Rhodesia twenty-seven years to reach her present point. The development of N. Rhodesia began much later; settlement was not seriously attempted until 1904, and questions of land ownership and concession rights are still undecided. There are many possibilities in N. Rhodesia, but it is a country which needs vast sums expended on communications and other development work before it can be brought into line with Southern Rhodesia. There is an annual deficit of £60,000 on administration. This is to be guaranteed by the B.S.A. Co., but that does not affect the fact that whereas S. Rhodesia was solvent before the war, and will certainly soon be solvent again, United Rhodesia will have a sort of chronic deficit. Does anyone suppose that if United Rhodesia got self-government the B.S.A. Co. would still be responsible for the deficit?

No! *Amalgamation means the indefinite postponement of self-government*, and as for that "influx" of population which is to compensate us, we must remember that if a population of 32,000 white people is too small for self-government in a territory of 280,000 square miles with 700,000 natives, it will have to more than double itself in order to "catch up" with a territory which will be more than twice that size and with a native population also more than doubled!

### WHAT ARE OUR RESOURCES?

But to return to the point—how would Amalgamation affect our financial evolution? What are our resources, and how will Amalgamation increase them? Minerals, of course—but our minerals are private property, forever alienated, and although they brought men and money into the country at the beginning they are now actually taking wealth out of the country and are not a sufficient source of profit to the State to compensate for the fact that they are using up irreplaceable national capital. They are, of course, bearing quite a heavy charge, but for the benefit of the Company, not the Rhodesian administration. Land: until the Privy Council gives its long-deferred decision we do not know what the position may be in the future, but at present we do not own a rood of land in S. Rhodesia. The Munitions and Resources report has revealed to us many subsidiary resources, some of them of considerable potential value, but all fatally handicapped—"throttled" is an appropriate word—by the fact that Rhodesia does not own a mile of railway and cannot control railway policy. How will Amalgamation affect this state of affairs? To whom will the land in N. Rhodesia belong, and on what terms? I find it is assumed, and by people whose opinion I feel loth to question, that this enquiry has been answered, and that the land is indisputably the property of the B.S.A. Co., but I am not quite convinced. One

would like to know more about that title and about the concessions which they, in their turn, have made. What about mineral rights? What about railway concessions? Is there anything left that is unalienated, and to whom will the reversion of it come?

It is apparent that too much has been left to the imagination in the statements regarding the increase of prosperity and population which Amalgamation may bring about. Incidentally, no one seems to trouble about the prosperity of N. Rhodesia, which can hardly be assured if she is handed over to a country which is still struggling for population and has little or no money to spare for developing fresh territory.

#### NORTHERN RHODESIA'S INTERESTS.

The following extracts from a paper read before the Royal Colonial Institute by the late Colonel St. Hill Gibbons, a pioneer farmer and land-owner in N. Rhodesia, who was also employed on the delimitation of boundaries, will give the question from a N. Rhodesian's point of view. For "South Africa" read "South Rhodesia."

"We are a sub-tropical, a planting as opposed to a farming country. We are not going to send our goods by the Cape in future, but by a port on the west coast, while locally our market is in the north. . . . Personally I have always felt that we in the north are destined not to become part of the South African Union, but a separate, a Central African Confederation. Those who have crossed the Zambesi at the Victoria Falls must have been impressed by the fact that they have left South Africa behind. They enter a sub-tropical country, where the meteorological conditions, the type of native and other natural features are entirely different."—[R.C.I., April, 1911.]

"Geographical position and local environment mould the political doctrines of a country. . . . To attempt to force a stream uphill is no more unreasonable than to endeavour to divert trade into unnatural channels. . . . A glance at the map indicates Lobito Bay on the west coast to be Northern Rhodesia's natural seaport. A railway destined to connect that port with the north to south line in Katanga is already constructed for 390 miles eastward (January, 1914). . . . The distance by rail from Beira to the centre of North Rhodesia is much the same as that taken by the deviating route from the latter point to Lobito Bay, but there will be a saving of 4,000 miles in sea transport and in the extra time involved. . . . You will have gathered from the foregoing that the prospect of North Rhodesia and South Africa developing on parallel lines is not obvious. South Africa is a farming country; North Rhodesia is in the planter's zone. Available markets are not held in common, and trade routes to the coast will run in opposite directions."—[Paper read before R.C.I., January, 1914.]

The question of trade routes has been raised in connection with Amalgamation, which makes Colonel Gibbons' remarks apposite. There is very little doubt that with the end of the war will come renewed activity on the part of all people who are interested in tropical African possessions. The Lobito Bay line has no great natural difficulties to encounter, and with so much completed should soon reach the rich mineral-bearing area which it is intended to tap. Here is at once North Rhodesia's market and her outlet to the coast. Why her trade should be expected to flow southward, to Beira, is not clear, nor how that traffic, even were it so to flow, would benefit South Rhodesia, since we do not own the railways. Anything imported would come direct from the seaboard—why employ a middleman in South Rhodesia? And for the rest, North Rhodesia produces grain, cattle and tobacco—what else could we send to this "northern market"? *Inter alia*, during 1908-9, North Rhodesia supplied 90 per cent. of the beef used in Bulawayo, beasts to the value of £100,000 entering South Rhodesia that year—before the



appearance of "fly" caused the closing of the country, and subsequently the imposition of quarantine and other regulations, which the North Rhodesian farmer resents as the selfish attempt of South Rhodesia to keep the cattle market to herself. It may be said, in passing, that whereas before 1909 South Rhodesia was a buyer of cattle, she is now a seller.

### A CENTRAL AFRICAN STATE.

This view of the future of Central Africa, as apart from that of South Africa, was supported by Lord Milner, viz., that Northern Rhodesia, Nyasaland (and since the war we may perhaps add East Africa) are destined to form a great Central African State, not necessarily a "white man's" State, or self-governing, but on the lines of a tropical dependency. Certainly they are linked together by questions of communications and similarity of conditions. It is too big a subject for this pamphlet, but must be mentioned because some people seem to imagine that the Union will "grab" all this region. It is very doubtful if the Union would wish to be saddled with a huge and expensive Central African State, suitable chiefly for development as a tropical dependency and containing large native populations. It is far more likely that such a State would be placed under the Imperial administration, but it is also almost certain that German East Africa will be set aside for free immigration from India. In any case, *the political future of these countries is uncertain, whereas our own is clearly marked out so long as we do not compromise it.* We have struggled out of the early development stage and are trying to realise the Founder's aspirations by building up a country which is a real home for a population of "small" men—not merely big ranch owners or transitory miners—where every class that makes up a civilised community is represented, small farmers, traders, professional and business men and artisans. If we link our fate *now* with that of Northern Rhodesia we cannot continue to advance at the same pace.

### AMALGAMATION IN THE FUTURE.

Whatever may be the view as to the Amalgamation proposal, nothing in the refusal to amalgamate *under our present conditions* prejudices the possibility of union of the two Rhodesias under other circumstances later on, should the ideal of a Central African State not be realised. It has been urged that it is a patriotic duty for Southern Rhodesia to assume this burden. Why? N. Rhodesia is under the British flag and will remain within the Empire. It is not in the least patriotic to undertake responsibilities for which we are not qualified. It is our duty to Grow Up and take our place in the Empire as part of self-governing South Africa. Our own development—political and economic (they are bound up together) is our first duty.

## PART III

### NORTH OR SOUTH.

In the statement which the Visiting Directors put before the country with regard to Amalgamation a feature was made of the point that Amalgamation would prove a barrier to Union. The B.S.A. Co. professed itself as quite in agreement with the majority of Rhodesians in their opposition to Union. As to this it must be said that their conversion to this point of view must be of recent date since Sir Starr Jameson in 1913, in his speech to the shareholders in London, congratulated them on the fact that Rhodesia was "drawing nearer to our neighbours in the South." At almost the same time he practically won the election for the Chartered Company in Rhodesia by telling the people that their choice was between Charter rule and Union,

since the Colonial Office would make Union a *sine qua non* if they got responsible government—a statement afterwards sharply disavowed by Mr. Harcourt. The fact is that the B.S.A. Co. has had two voices in this matter—one for Rhodesia and one for England, especially while a Radical Government was in power which regarded the Union as its pet child.

As I have said, Rhodesia does not often come before the British public, but on the few occasions which have occurred, such as the reading of a paper before the Royal Colonial Institute, or the annual dinner of the Rhodesian pioneers, the inclusion of Southern Rhodesia in the Union was always treated as a matter of course. Pro-Union speakers like the late Sir Richard Solomon were invited to make speeches, and if any settler got up and dissented he was reassured by the statement that "*we should come in at our own time and in our own way.*" That is, of course, the ideal to aim at. *We want to be free agents. If we remain under Charter rule we are not free agents. If we amalgamate we are not (according to the Chartered Company) free agents.* If what they suggest is true a United Rhodesia would not be welcomed by the Union. She might want, for economic reasons vital to her progress, to join the Union, but the door might be banged in her face. This, at all events, seems to be the meaning of the statement that Union "would be more difficult" after Amalgamation.

But, again, there is little evidence of this contention, and indeed one writer in the "Rhodesia Herald," Mr. Trevor Fletcher, who is strongly in favour of Union, regards Amalgamation as a necessary step towards it!

On the whole I am inclined to think that Mr. Trevor Fletcher is wrong and the Company are right. The view that Northern Rhodesia and the Central African States with which her future is bound up would progress better if developed apart from self-governing South Africa, and that Southern Rhodesia's future is bound up with that of the Union, was expressed by Lord Milner in a speech before the Royal Colonial Institute. It is borne out by the quotations I have already given from Colonel St. Hill Gibbons. The question of the future of N. Rhodesia is a controversial one, and I have been severely criticised for calling it a "tropical dependency." I have given my two authorities. Whether they are right or wrong in their estimates and predictions, we cannot evade the conclusion that *we may make an irrevocable mistake if, at this stage of our development, we link our fate irrevocably with the countries to the north of the Zambesi and prejudice the possibility of an alliance to the South.*

Once again, this is a choice we ought not to be asked to make until we have responsible government and understand our position more clearly than is possible at present.

### DRAWBACKS TO UNION.

At the same time I believe that what Sir Starr Jameson in 1913 eulogised as the "drawing nearer to the people in the South" received a severe check owing to the rebellion. People who believed political union to be a sign of the union of hearts (there were many such in Great Britain, and possibly also in Rhodesia) were disappointed when the veil was rent and treachery and treason stood revealed. I personally know at least one man in this country who was dubbed "pro-Boer" at one time, but who has now turned so violently against the Dutch element that the idea of Union is abhorrent to him. But those of us who were more or less behind the scenes all the time, and to whom the South African rebellion and German intrigues in the Union were no surprise, are differently affected. The firmness with which the rebellion was suppressed was more of a surprise, and, while the

release of the political prisoners has led to adverse comment, it must be recollected that the crime of rebellion against the State has never been either regarded or treated on stereotyped lines as punishable with death, but has always been dealt with according to circumstances and in accordance with policy rather than the letter of the law. As a matter of fact, to rebel against the Government has hitherto been the Boers' recognised method of political warfare, and has usually proved extremely profitable—the blessed word “*compensatie*” occurs to one's thoughts—but this time, so far as we can judge, it has brought no grist to the rebels' mill. General Botha and General Smuts have dealt effectively with the trouble, and it has divided sheep from goats, driven the more advanced and progressive Dutch into the same camp as the English, and so, probably for the first time, made a political cleavage in the Union which does not follow racial lines.

### THE NEW DAY IN SOUTH AFRICA.

The successful conclusion of a second African campaign, to which we look forward, and the dispatch of Union troops to Europe, makes a great step forward in South African unity. It may be true that a considerable proportion of those who are fighting are loyalist by birth or tradition, but not all. The official figures for the German West campaign shew almost equal proportions of British and Dutch. There is nothing which cements the parts of a composite nation more closely than blood shed in a common cause, and among the benefits bestowed by the German Emperor on the British Empire I think we may count the founding of a South African nation. Mr. Hofmeyr has touched the right note in pointing out that the next generation must mark a great difference in outlook.

### FORCES OF REACTION.

That there are forces of reaction at work no reasonable observer will deny. Chief among them are the politico-religious influences which are paramount in education. I have heard it argued that bilingualism is not, in itself, a handicap; rather that it helps to quicken the brain and enlarge the sympathies, but while this may be the case when both the languages open doors on life and literature, or even when one is acquired as an exercise in precision of expression, it does not apply when a tongue is concerned which has neither literature nor classical beauty. Under such circumstances there is no adequate compensation for the inconvenience of a dual language both in schools and in the civil service. Ten years ago it appeared as though the taal were doomed to die a natural death, but the entire reversal of Lord Milner's educational policy galvanised it into life as “*Afrikaans*.” Still, with a language that leads nowhere in the business and industrial world, which cannot be used for scientific or literary purposes, and which is deficient in many other respects, one can fairly hope that, with the waning of the racial bitterness which was behind its revival, may come a more reasonable attitude as to the claims of this language for “equality” with a great world-wide tongue like English.

At the same time I do not believe that the Dutch in South Africa will give up their mother tongue. The persistence with which such a language is cherished has been evidenced in a remarkable manner in Europe in such countries as Serbia, Poland or Bohemia.

### OTHER “LANGUAGE QUESTIONS.”

The recent revivals of Erse and Gaelic in Ireland, Wales and Scotland are on a rather different plane, being purely literary in origin, and pursued in a dilettante spirit by the more educated class. The best parallel is, of



course, found in Canada, and no one who wants to form a reasoned opinion on the question of the Dutch language in Africa can afford to neglect the Canadian precedent. That it holds out promise of an easy solution no one can pretend, but that it demonstrates the possibility of a working compromise is also clear. There are many analogous circumstances—the paramount influence in each case of a religious body, the rapid natural increase of the non-English-speaking population, and the fact that the language actually spoken is a *patois* and does not necessarily bring the speaker into touch with the European country or literature to which the parent language belongs.

### EDUCATION.

The greatest difficulties which have hitherto arisen both in Canada and South Africa in this question of adjusting the claims of rival languages have been due to defective education in a section of the population. Rhodesia is now taking a serious interest in the education question, and if she can bring a sound education within reach of every child, British or Dutch, in the territory she will have solved beforehand many of the so-called racial problems.

### OUR "LONELY FURROW."

Can Rhodesia afford to dismiss all thought of Union rather than face the language question? Can we continue to plough a lonely furrow and watch from our solitude the South African nation grow up without us? These are questions which Rhodesians ought frankly to ask themselves, weighing the pros and cons as fairly and without prejudice as they may.

### ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS.

Whatever may be the private opinion of Rhodesians as to the Union, it is impossible to deny that South Africa is entering a period of great progress and prosperity. It has been very striking to one who had not been in Africa since 1904 to find that a country which, at that date, was at a very low ebb, importing practically all its food and yet suffering from such depression that the sight of white men tramping to the coast was painfully common, is now in the full tide of such prosperity that she is able with the greatest ease to raise an internal loan of £10,000,000. Manufactures of every kind have sprung up in the Union, and the most important feature of all is that she is entering the list of meat-exporting countries. That there is a future for dairy and other agricultural products is also certain. One of the drawbacks from which South African States have suffered in the past has been the difficulty of raising money for development. For political reasons they have not enjoyed advantages given by the Imperial Government to such countries as Australia. I believe that difficulty now to be removed. General Botha, speaking at Kokstad some months ago, said: "Never were the relations of South Africa and the Imperial Government more satisfactory, affording opportunity to build up a great country," and he made a striking allusion to the common sacrifices of Boer and Briton, and paid a tribute to "our Navy." Quite frankly this speech indicates General Botha's belief that Imperial credit or blessing or loans (which is the same thing) is to be looked for in the future as a help to S. Africa. Certain outstanding questions, especially as to the treatment of Indian subjects of the King, which, in conjunction with racial questions, have militated against S. Africa in the money market in the past, are in a fair way to be finally settled. The acquisition of German East Africa by the Imperial Government may be a way out of the coolie difficulty. In any case there is no doubt that the services of South Africa rank very high and entitle her to every possible

consideration, which will be increased and not diminished by the peculiar conditions prevailing and by her recent history. South Africa, as General Botha said the other day, is not going to build her future out of her past.

### WHERE RHODESIA "COMES IN."

Naturally Rhodesia hopes to share in the prosperity which seems to be dawning on the sub-continent, and there are beginnings already made which every Rhodesian farmer is watching keenly, with regard to the export of live stock and of frozen and chilled meat. It is probable that the latter industries, so far as Matabeleland and a large portion of Mashonaland (including the Liebig ranches) are concerned, will have to be developed through Delagoa Bay as the nearest port and as already possessing the necessary facilities for cold storage.

I have just read an interview with Mr. Walsh, the B.S.A. Co.'s expert on cattle, who expressed the belief that Southern Rhodesia is the best ranching country in the world, and added that for the last three or four months she has sent 1,000 head of cattle per month to the Johannesburg market. "*The day is coming*," he said, "*when Rhodesia will contribute a large supply of first-class beef to the markets of the world.* . . . It can in due course send large droves of cattle down to the Union for fattening purposes or to take the place of cattle which South Africa finds it more profitable to send overseas." Such roseate views as these must be largely contingent on the goodwill of our Southern neighbours. If it is true that our future prosperity depends on the development of Southern and Overseas markets (and where else can we sell our produce?), if our trade is to flow over Union railways, and, in all probability, to depend on steamship lines controlled by the Union—if, in short, our economic future is bound up with that of South Africa, how are we to keep our political future distinct? Economic and political development are so closely interwoven that they cannot be considered separately.

### IMPERIAL BENEVOLENCE.

I have shewn that the Union is obviously relying on Imperial help in future. It is highly probable that Southern Rhodesia, emerging from the Chartered Company stage and "coming of age," will also require some Imperial benevolence to set her on her feet. When that time comes the part played by the Rhodesian settlers and the sacrifices they have made to take a worthy share in the great war, will surely not be forgotten. But while it is practically impossible for Rhodesia to get the kind of help she wants under the present régime, it is also doubtful whether she can secure it under any circumstances, save as a part, actually or prospectively, of self-governing South Africa. To speak quite plainly, so long as Rhodesia's relations with the rest of South Africa are in doubt, her economic position is uncertain and insecure. If her future is irrevocably linked with Central Africa that is, with regions in a different stage of political and economic development, she must take an entirely different view of that future.

### WHAT WE WANT.

It is useless, of course, to talk of building up a country without money—especially where the white man must live as a "sahib class." We know that a good deal of money has been put into Rhodesia—most of it, it is true, down holes—but still the early development was more than respectable. A quarter of a century is not so long, after all, and when we remember that S. Rhodesia has been built up by private enterprise we may well feel proud of the race to which such feats are possible. The B.S.A. Co. has a great

record behind it. But is it not obvious that we have reached a stage at which we must stand still unless there is some radical change in our status? We want two things—population and money for development. It is hard to say which should come first, but both we must have. How are we going to get them under the present régime, and how would they be affected by Union on the one hand and Amalgamation on the other?

### RHODESIANS AND UNION.

I believe that, while very few Rhodesians would be prepared for immediate Union, the majority have regarded it for some years as ultimately though disagreeably inevitable, and the Amalgamation proposal, if it offered a genuine chance of developing in another direction, north instead of south, would be welcomed by many—has indeed been so welcomed. I have tried to give some reasons for my belief that it is no true alternative—the *basic reasons for Union will always remain, whatever may be our relations with North Rhodesia, and we can only purchase a possible safety from Union at the price of our own economic development.* At the same time it is by no means certain that we should be forced to go into Union if the Company withdrew its aegis from us. We can only go in, I take it, with full responsible government, and there are many people who believe that an intermediate stage under the Crown, with representative government, would be desirable. I do not altogether share this view, although I think a period of Crown government would have been most useful earlier in our career. Even without such a stage, however, it would be a reasonable request that we should be permitted time to evolve our own representative institutions before engaging on equal terms with the other provinces of the Union. We should go in, that is, at our own time and in our own way. If the time were short that would be because we saw our interests and opportunities plainly, and if Rhodesians themselves cannot be trusted with their own destinies they have not much to be proud of.

### WHERE ARE WE STEERING TO?

The point is—to know where we are steering to. The Amalgamation proposal, in the terms in which it was introduced, is a clear attempt to confuse the issues and to postpone the day when the people of Rhodesia can take the helm themselves. To reject it now does not and cannot mean any Imperial loss. Northern Rhodesia is under the British flag and will remain so. It may develop independently of South Africa, and it may be taken over by the latter at some future time and in some other way. On the other hand, *Southern Rhodesia owes it to her Founder, to the Empire, and to herself to develop her own internal resources and build up her population now—not twenty years hence.*

Are the people of Southern Rhodesia satisfied that the progress under the present régime is all that could be hoped for? Do they see their way to development without further investment of capital—for they may be sure the B.S.A. Co. is not prepared to find any more large sums to be spent in development of which they may not reap the fruits? And while the country is the private preserve of the Company outside investment cannot be expected. Do they see any future for Rhodesians, ploughing their lonely furrow, while the great South African nation is in the making down south, and are they sure they will get better terms and a better chance of “preserving their identity” if they put off the thought of Union another twenty or thirty years? Remember, the power, population and importance of the Union are growing far faster than that of Rhodesia, and the relative position may be less advantageous in twenty or thirty years than in five or ten. Even in Rhodesia herself those who wish to emphasize “British” traditions may be in a more



favourable position now than at any future date. I want to see Rhodesia's British traditions used for the advantage of the Empire—but there is such a thing as hiding one's talent in a napkin.

### “GRASP THE NETTLE.”

These questions are not asked, nor these contingencies suggested, in any dogmatic spirit, but in the belief that they must be squarely faced if Rhodesia is to shape her course wisely. I believe in grasping the nettle. Southern Rhodesia needs to take a firm grip, for there are many stings in this question of her political future.

### TO SUM UP.

To sum up: Whether one is in favour of asking for responsible government at an early date or no, it is apparent that there are strong objections to taking any definite step like Amalgamation at the present stage of our history. We do not know sufficiently clearly what would be the effect of our political evolution; still less how it would affect our economic development. And, out of the considerations advanced in this pamphlet emerges, I think, another point—the unsatisfactory character of our present status. We do not know our own position as to the land, we do not know, in the least, what considerations will govern railway policy in the near future, we can only raise money by loan from the B.S.A. Co., and that Company can refuse such loans, so we do not know the basis of our financial position. We must pay for our own administration, but we cannot allocate our own revenue. We cannot take any steps towards land settlement—that is the affair of the Commercial side of the Company, and their policy is influenced by quite other considerations than those which might affect us. What might be a good investment for us might be a bad one for them. And so on, through the whole range of our affairs.

It is not that the Company is hostile or even indifferent to our interests or that their interests run counter to those of the country as a whole. It is a question of perspective. *The interests of a trading Company may, broadly speaking, coincide with the interests of the country in which they trade, but they do not constitute the whole interests of that country, and it is the right of the people to decide the proportion which private commercial interests shall bear to the wider question of the welfare of the community as a whole.*

Until we reach the stage in which the people of Rhodesia are in a position to exercise those rights we cannot hope for that general progress which has marked all self-governing communities of our race, and for which our natural resources entitle us to hope. We should have difficulties and we should make mistakes, but this will be the case as much twenty years hence as now. *We shall learn from our mistakes and we shall have to co-operate to overcome our difficulties—useful experiences both.*

I believe the time is very near when we ought to seriously contemplate this change, because *the conclusion of the war will see a re-organisation of the British Empire, and in that new Commonwealth of five free nations I want Rhodesia to take her place and play her part.*

ETHEL COLQUHOUN JOLLIE.

MELSETTER, JANUARY, 1917.





